§ 05-12-010, Title, Purpose, and Scope 

§ 05-12-010, Title 

      As the purpose of the RLTO is to protect and promote the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and to establish the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, it shall be liberally construed.  Friedman v. Krupp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443; 668 N.E.2d 142, 147 (1st Dist. 1996). 
 

§ 05-12-020, Exclusions 

Six Unit Limit of Sub-Section (a) Determined by Total Number of Units Not Rented Units 

      To fall within the exemption of this section, a building must have few six or fewer total units.  If a building has seven units, but only six or fewer are occupied at the time of rental, the RLTO still applies.  A "unit" is defined § 05-12-030(a).  Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 2d 351, 632 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1993). 

 

§ 05-12-030, Definitions 

A Condominium Owner’s Association is Not a "Landlord" as Defined by the RLTO 

      The RLTO, § 5-12-030(b) defines "landlord" as "the owner, agent, lessor or sub-lessor, or the successor in interest of any of them."  A condominium association becomes neither a "successor in interest" nor a "landlord" under the RLTO where it exercises its powers under the Condominium Property Act (735 ILCS 5/9-102) to bring an action against the tenant of a condominium owner through the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.  Spiegel v. Hollywood Towers Condominium Association, 283 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998-9; 671 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

§ 05-12-080, Security Deposits 

When is a Unit "Vacated" under Sub-Section (d)? 

      A tenant vacates when she actually surrenders possession of the leasehold, and the 45-day window for return of the security deposit accrues at that time.  Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 2d 351, 361; 632 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1st Dist. 1993). 

Damage Awards Under Sub-Section (f) are Not Abated For Portions of Security Deposits Actually Returned 

      The actual security deposit is not included in the statutory damages available under subsection (f).  The RLTO provides for the return of the deposit and statutory damages when the landlord fails to issue a proper receipt to a tenant or prospective tenant.  Solomon v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 132, 136-137; 612 N.E.2d 3, 10 (1st Dist. 1993). 

 

No Requirement of "Willful" or "Knowing" Violation by Landlord under Sub-Section (f) 

      Nothing in section 5-12-080(f) requires proof that the landlord’s actions were knowing or willful.  A landlord’s duty to comply with the statute is absolute.  If a landlord requires a security deposit, the landlord is required to pay the tenant interest on that deposit.  If he fails to do so, he is liable to the tenant for the damages specified in the statue.  Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10; 754 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2001).   

      Note that in an earlier unrelated case from the Appellate Court, First District, a court held the opposite, stating that in order to be subject to the penalty provisions of § 5-12-080(f), a landlord’s conduct must have been willful.  Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964, 972; 665 N.E.2d 357, 363 (1st Dist. 1996).  The Lawrence court relied on the appeals court (expressly affirming that part of the case) ruling to overrule Szpila in part, and distinguish it in part.  The appellate court in Lawrence held that where Szpila could be read to require a proof of willfulness on a single count under § 05-12-080(f), it was overruled.  The court went on to distinguish and limit the proper holding of Szpila:  that where there are a series of violations of the section related to a series of related transactions (the renting of one apartment and the renewal of a lease over a period of years), and the defendant-landlord has the equitable defense of laches, courts will impose a requirement that the plaintiff-tenant show willful action on the part of the defendant-landlord.  Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159; 717 N.E.2d 443, 445-6 (1st Dist. 1999).  Reading the three cases together, some gray area still exists.  One could argue that absent a showing of willfulness, a plaintiff-tenant can still treat the series of occurrences as one transaction, and thus be entitled to a single award of damages under 05-12-080(f).  Conversely, where a plaintiff-tenant can show willfulness, a plaintiff might be entitled to a separate damages award for each distinct violation in the series, though laches might still be a defense.  The cases do not address this issue directly. 

Sub-Section (f) Imposes "Statutory Penalties" and as Such Claims Brought Under it Subject to Two-Year Statue of Limitations 

      Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, "actions for damages for a statutory penalty" have a two-year statute of limitations, 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1996).  Section 5-12-080(f) imposes a "statutory penalty," and is therefore subject to that two-year statute of limitations.  Namur v. The Habitat Company, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1013; 691 N.E.2d 782, 786 (1st Dist. 1998).  Where Plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon commingling of assets, it accrues when the landlord deposits the security deposit.  Id.  [See also discussion of § 05-12-170, infra.] 

 

There are no "de minimus" or "no harm" exceptions to this section. 

      All relevant authority rejects excuses for commingling and the "no harm" argument where the security deposit is returned.  Plambeck v.Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 272; 666 N.E2d 670, 676-7 (1st Dist. 1996).   

 

§ 05-12-100, Notice of Conditions Affecting Habitability 

No "de minimus" or "materiality" exceptions to sub-section (a) 

      Unlike other sections of the RLTO, which expressly include materiality language, this sub-section contains no qualifying language and is aimed at disclosure of all violations without regard for the degree to which they affect habitability.  There is no de minimus exception.  Plambeck v.Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 271; 666 N.E2d 670, 676 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

§ 05-12-110, Tenant Remedies 

Any Matter "Arising Under" the RLTO is "Germane" 

      Any matter "arising under" the RLTO is germane, and thus may be introduced by joinder, counterclaim, affirmative defense, or otherwise.  American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1044-5; 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1169-70 (1st Dist. 1997). 

Time To Cure Under Sub-Section (a) 

      Terminating the lease is a distinct act from vacating the premises.  Just because a tenant vacates the premises, it does not mean that tenant failed to give full 14 days to cure.  Plambeck v.Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 271; 666 N.E2d 670, 675 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

When Does a Tenant Withhold or Deduct Rent Under Sub-Section (d)?  When Can a Tenant Withhold or Deduct Rent Under Sub-Section (d)? 

      A tenant withholds or deducts rent under the RLTO when the landlord receives partial payment, not when the tenant mails, posts, or sends partial payment.  But a tenant cannot deduct rent under the RLTO until the landlord has received written notice of the tenant’s intent to deduct rent, and has had a full 14 day opportunity during which to make requested repairs.  American National Bank v.Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038-40; 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1165-6 (1st Dist. 1997). 

 

§ 05-12-140, Rental Agreement 

An Attorneys’ Fees Clause is Permissible To The Extent It Does Not Conflict With the RLTO 

      A fees clause that provides for a tenant to pay landlord’s attorneys’ fees "to the extent permissible by courts, statutes, or ordinances" is compatible with this section of the RLTO.  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267; 666 N.E2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996). 

No Liability Limitation Clauses Allowed Under the RLTO 

      The RLTO prohibits "the limitation of any liability."  The command to delete any and all exculpatory clauses is complete and unambiguous, and it does not allow for any qualification.  A lease may not even contain a conditional liability limitation clause containing language analogous to, "to the extent permissible by courts, statutes, or ordinances."  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 268; 666 N.E2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

No Waiver of Notice Allowed Under the RLTO 

      The RLTO prohibits lease clauses requiring tenants agreement "to waive any written termination of tenancy notice or manner of service."  The command to delete waiver of notice clauses is clear and absolute.  Such clauses will not be saved for language analogous to "subject to the provision of the Chicago Landlord and Tenant Ordinance."  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 269; 666 N.E2d 670, 675 (1st Dist. 1996). 

Upheld Sub-Section (g) 

      See Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 269; 666 N.E2d 670, 6675 (1st Dist. 1996). 
 

§ 05-12-150, Prohibition On Retaliatory Conduct By Landlord 

Retaliatory Conduct is "Germane" and May Be Introduced as an Affirmative Defense to a Forcible Entry and Detainer Action 

      See American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1044-5; 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1169-70 (1st Dist. 1997), and supra under § 05-12-110. 

 

§ 05-12-170, Summary of Ordinance Attached to Rental Agreement 

Tenant’s Motive is Irrelevant 

      A tenant’s motive for invoking the right of termination provided under this section is simply not relevant to the determination whether the termination is valid.  There is no "clean hands" doctrine overlaid on the text of this section, and imposing one would counter-act the inherent purpose of the RLTO to correct the historical disparity between bargaining powers of landlord and tenant.  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266-7; 666 N.E2d 670, 673-4 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

§ 05-12-180, Attorney’s Fees 

A Party is Entitled to an Appropriate Hearing on Attorneys’ Fees 

      This section provides for reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing plaintiff.  That plaintiff is entitled to an appropriate hearing to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 273; 666 N.E2d 670, 677 (1st Dist. 1996). 

 

Burden of the Party Pleading for Attorneys’ Fees 

      It is incumbent upon the petition for fees to specify the services performed, by whom they were performed, the time expended and an hourly rate charged therefore.  Petitioner must present records maintained during the litigation containing facts and computations upon which the charges are predicated.  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 273-4; 666 N.E2d 670, 677-8 (1st Dist. 1996). 

Factors for Court to Consider in Awarding Attorney’s Fees 

      In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the trial court should consider a variety of factors, including the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the degree of responsibility required, the usual and customary charge for the same of similar services in the community, and whether there is a reasonable connection between the fees charged and the litigation.  The trial court is permitted to use its own knowledge and experience to assess the time required to complete particular activities, and a reviewing court may not reverse an award of attorneys’ fees merely because it may have reached a different conclusion.  Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 273; 666 N.E2d 670, 677-8 (1st Dist. 1996). 

A Court May Not Discount an Award of Attorney’s Fees To a Party Represented by Not-For-Profit Legal Service Providers 

      Discounting the legal fees awarded to legal aid attorneys would serve only to chill the impulse of attorneys to pursue and continue careers in legal service work, because the receipt of such fees promotes the health and continued existence of their employing organizations.  Pitts v. Holt, 304 Ill. App. 3d 871, 874; 710 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1st Dist. 1999). 

Policy Behind Provision 

      See Pitts v. Holt, 304 Ill. App. 3d 871; 710 N.E.2d 155 (1st Dist. 1999). 
 

RLTO Generally 

The RLTO Does Not Violate the United States Constitution 

      See Chicago Bd. Of Realtors, Inc. v. Chicago, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir.  1987).  Analyzes RLTO with respect to the Contract Clause, Procedural Due Process, Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine, and Pre-Emption. 

 

The RLTO Supercedes § 9-207 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 

      The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an ordinance that is within a municipality’s home-rule powers supercedes, within the home-rule unit’s territory, a conflicting statute passed before the 1970 Illinois Constitution took effect on July 1, 1971.  Because § 9-207 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/9-207 (West 1996) was passed prior to July 1, 1971; the municipality of Chicago is a home-rule unit; and the ordinance addresses the well being of its citizens, we conclude that the ordinance supercedes the statute in this instance.  Reed v. Burns, 238 Ill. App. 3d 148, 152-4; 606 N.E.2d 152, 154-5 (1st Dist. 1992).