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§ 05-12-180, Attorney's Fees
A Party is
Entitled to an Appropriate Hearing on Attorneys’ Fees under Chicago
RLTO
§
180
Plambeck v. Greystone
Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 273 (1st Dist. 1996).
This section provides for
reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing plaintiff. That
plaintiff is entitled to an appropriate hearing to determine
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
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Landlord
cannot enforce attorney fee shifting provision in lease against
tenant
Willis v. NAICO Real Estate
----------- (1st Dist. 2008).
Even if a
landlord prevails on a counterclaim against a tenant for rent or
damage, the landlord cannot recover its reasonable attorney fees
against the tenant in reliance on a lease provision that says the
tenant is responsible for the landlord's attorney fees and costs in
any action arising out of the lease.
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Discounting the legal fees
awarded to legal aid attorneys would serve only to chill the impulse of
attorneys to pursue and continue careers in legal service work, because
the receipt of such fees promotes the health and continued existence of
their employing organizations.
Pitts v. Holt, 304 Ill. App. 3d 871-875 (1st Dist.
1999)
"Following a jury trial, the court entered judgment in favor of defendant
and against plaintiffs on both plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's
counter-complaint. Thus, defendant's rent withholding was upheld and she
was allowed to retain possession of the premises. In addition, she was
awarded $ 1,200 in damages, the statutory maximum under the Ordinance.
Subsequently, defendant moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to
section
5-12-180 of the Ordinance. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded
$ 500 to defendant's attorneys. Defendant now appeals this award,
alleging that her actual attorney's fees cannot be reasonably set below
$ 5,581.25, and that the trial court's $ 500 award amounts to an abuse
of discretion.
* * *
In this case, defendant's attorneys itemized 69.40 hours of work
performed to defend their client against an unlawful eviction,
ultimately securing the maximum statutory damages provided by the
Ordinance. At the hearing, the court indicated that it had no objection
to the amount of work claimed done on behalf of the defendant, with the
exception of the fact that she used two attorneys to represent her at
the trial when one would have been sufficient. The second attorney's
trial work accounted for $3,787.50 of the total $ 9,368.75 sought by
plaintiff. The court specifically stated that the rates charged by the
defendant’s attorneys were low, and further stated that, given their
experience, higher rates could have been charged if the defendant's
attorneys had been in private practice.
* * *
After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we find the
trial court's award of $ 500 is not only inconsistent with the evidence
presented at the fee hearing, but also with the public policy behind the
fee-shifting provisions of the Ordinance. The Ordinance was passed with
a recognition of the historical disparity of bargaining positions
between landlord and tenants and to protect tenants from overreaching by
residential landlords. Plambeck, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 267. The
attorney’s fees provisions are meant to give a financial incentive to
attorneys to litigate on behalf of those clients who have meritorious
cases but who, due to the limited nature of the controversy, would not
normally consider litigation as being in their client's financial best
interest. Rather than supporting this policy, the court's fee award
reflects compensation at a rate equal to 3 hours of work at the hourly
rate charged by either of defendant's attorneys. Such an award creates
very little incentive for attorneys to accept residential tenants in a
dispute likely to require litigation. The sum awarded, in our view, is
nominal at best, and could be considered by some to be punitive.
*
* *
“‘Whether or not [the client] agreed to pay a fee and in what amount is
not decisive. *** The criterion for the court is not what the parties
agreed but what is reasonable.’ Whether the attorney charges a fee
or has an agreement that the organization that employs him will receive
any awarded attorneys’ fees are not bases on which to deny or limit
attorneys' fees or expenses.”
*
* *
In addition, we note that assessing reasonable fees has the potential
added benefit of deterring wrongdoing in the first place.
Nor do we think the fact that plaintiff recovered only $ 1,200 should
significantly limit defendant's attorney’s fees. Once again, such a
limitation would undermine vigorous enforcement of the Ordinance. In
Merchandise National Bank, for example, the court addressed similar
arguments in rejecting such limitations on attorney's fees in the Truth
in Lending context:
“[a] provision for attorney's fees helps assure that enforcement will
take place. But such a provision is rendered meaningless unless
attorneys for successful parties are given reasonably adequate
compensation for their services. The need for adequate compensation is
particularly important since the statutory penalty [for a Truth in
Lending claim] is limited to $ 1,000. If a presumption is imposed that a
successful attorney is allowed only the amount recovered by his client,
creditors can effectively preclude the filing of all Truth in Lending
actions. By refusing to negotiate even reasonable claims and by
litigating every case, creditors can soon force a debtor to terminate
litigation, not because his claim is invalid but because it is no longer
economically feasible for his attorney to continue the case.”
Merchandise National Bank, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 730.
The same logic applies to this case. If such a rule were not in place,
tenants would quickly find themselves unable to engage counsel.
*
* *
In light of the above, we vacate the circuit court’s fee award, which we
find to be an abuse of discretion and unsupported by the record, and
remand the case for further proceedings. We direct the court to
reconsider its decision in light of the above discussion and to enter a
fee award that is consistent with the
Ordinance.
For the foregoing reasons, the fee award of the circuit court of Cook
County is vacated; the case is remanded with directions.
CAMPBELL, P.J., and QUINN, J., concur." |
